Looking at some contemporary news is enough for generating a spontaneous feeling of preoccupation and alarm in all those who believe in God and the world to come, and are sincerely interested in working for the good and progress of humanity. For instance, we read, "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are translated into Arabic and Persian, with prefaces that describe them as ‘a reliable proof of the Jewish plot’"; (1) "The PLO-appointed ‘muftî’ Ikrâmah Sabrî preaches hate against the Jews and their religion from the pulpit of Masjid al-Aqsâ", (2) "Roger Garaudy writes antisemitic pamphlets wherein he renews the worst common senses of holocaust deniers". Even more preoccupying is the fact that, instead of condemning this shameful degeneration of senile speculation, some Arab governments express support for him and even try to introduce him as a "victim of a Jewish persecution".

As a Muslim and a man of religion, I am really disappointed in realizing that people who claim to be my co-religionists are involved in supporting this kind of criminal ideology, and trying to appropriate those guidelines of European antisemitic thought that prepared the ground for the Shoah. On the contrary, I hereby remind that the Islamic territory has been for many century a land of refuge for those Jews that were discriminated and persecuted in Europe; I am proud of the fact that ‘Omar Ibn al-Khattâb ended the ban preventing Jews to live in Jerusalem, while Salâh al-Dîn, after liberating Jerusalem from the hands of the Crusades, wrote to Jewish leaders, "Your exile is over, and whoever wants to come back is welcome". This paper of mine wants to be both a theoretical and a moral witnessing, notwithstanding the fact that practical solutions to the present situation do no seem to be easily at reach. May Allah relief us in our shortcomings.

In the same moment when, after a fatiguing work of dialogue and clarification, the Catholic Church is able to revise many of its historical prefigurations about the Jewish question, some exponent of pseudo-Islamic fundamentalism (3) are now trying to separate Christian antisemitism of old and to transplant its functions in the repertoire of their propagandistic tools. In front of a similar situation, I really feel that "silence is complicity", and cannot but exhort other Muslim scholars to overcome fear and to take a clear and unquestionable stand against this subcultural option. Apart from representing a barrier against other similar forms of racial discrimination, a refutation of antisemitism from an Islamic point of view could also be one of the most relevant contribute to interfaith dialogue and to cooperation between the different branches of the Abrahamitic family.

As a basic point of my paper, I firstly want to look at classical Islamic sources with the objective to show that that they do not support the so-called "Islamic anti-Zionism", preached by radical groups in Middle East and abroad. While reflecting on the historical development of this attitude and the dangers it represents for the contemporary world, it is necessary to underline that the idea of considering Jewish ‘Aliyah to Eretz Israel as a Western invasion and Zionists as new colonizers is quite recent, and has no connection with basic features of Islamic faith. According to the Holy Qur’ân no person, people or religious community can claim a permanent right of possession over a certain territory, since the earth belongs exclusively to Allah, and He is free to entrust rights of sovereignty to everyone He likes and for the time He likes:

From this verse it is possible to deduce a basic principle of Monotheistic philosophy of history: God can choose as He likes in the relationship between peoples and countries; sometimes He entrusts a land to a certain people, and sometimes He takes His possession back and gives it to another people. In general terms, we can say that He gives as a premium for obedience and takes back as a punishment for wickedness, but this rule does not permit us to say that God’s ways are always plain and clear under our eyes, since His secrets are far from being integrally accessible to human intellect.

The idea of making Islam a factor that prevents Arabs from recognizing any sovereign right of Jews over Palestine is – on the contrary – an artificial apparatus that has no precedent in Islamic classical sources. Reading anti-Zionism as a direct consequence of Islam is a form of explicit anti-historical misunderstanding, that implies uprooting Islam from its original religious contents and changing it into a mundane ideology. This deviation was systematically perpetrated by the late British-appointed "muftî" of Jerusalem, Amîn al-Husseynî, the one who - being morally and materially responsible for most of Arab defeats - hardly persecuted all Arabs who understood cooperation with Jews as a precious opportunity for the development of Palestine, and was so rooted in his hate for Jews to accept to put his religious position at the disposal of the anti-religious and anti-humanitarian ideology of National Socialism. After him, Jamâl al-Dîn ‘Abd al-Nassêr based his policy on Pan-Arabism, hate and contempt for Jews and line-up with Soviet Union. All these options were a determinant factor in causing Arab backwardness, but fortunately most of Nassêr’s mistakes were afterwards corrected by the martyr Anwâr Sadât. After the defeat of Nasserianism, the fundamentalist movements made anti-Zionism an outstanding part of their propaganda, trying to describe the negation of any right of Israelis over Palestine as rooted in Islamic tradition and derived from religious principles.

After being involved in wars against Israel, Sadât started understanding that hostility between Arabs and Israelis was damaging both peoples, and courageously chose to move a step toward peace, but was firstly ostracized by other Arab leaders, and then martyred by a group of fanatics. It is not well-known to the great public, but this option in favor of peace is not only the result of a political evolution, but was influenced by the fact that Sadât returned to be a practicing Muslim, and also became a disciple of a great Sufi master and Islamic scholar, Shaykh Muhammad al-Mutawalî al-Sha‘râwî al-Azharî. This Shaykh, recently disappeared, – may Allah be pleased with him – was regarded as the most important Islamic scholar of this century, and was openly preaching peace and cooperation between Muslims and Jews as the best option for the future. Notwithstanding his bad health, he decided to be a member of the Egyptian delegation that was going to visit Jerusalem, and raised his cry of pacification between the children of Ishmael and the children of Jacob from the pulpit of Masjid al-Aqsâ. (6) The fame of his scholarship was able, for a moment, to silence all those fundamentalists who used to say: "Peace with Israel is against Islam." After that, the General Assembly of the United Nations could hear the voice of the Egyptian President saying: "No more wars between Arabs and Israelis".

This plan for ideologization of Islam as an instrument of political fight finds nevertheless a relevant obstacle on its way, since a comparative analysis of Qur’anic and Torah sources reveal an agreement on the point that the link existing between Children of Israel and Land of Canaan is not depending on any kind of project of colonization, usurpation of the territory or abuse of human beings, but directly on God Almighty’s will, toward which we are asked to submit. As we learn form Jewish and Islamic Scriptures God, through His chosen servant Moses, decided to free the offspring of Jacob from slavery in Egypt and to constitute them as heirs of the Promised Land. This is described in the in the Glorious Qur’ân as

Whoever should claim that Jewish sovereignty over Palestine is something recent and depending on political plots would actually be denying the history of revelation and prophecy, as well as the clear teaching of the Holy Books. Unfortunately, ideological fundamentalism and political inexperience led some inadequate leader to inspire an attitude of walls against walls and chauvinistic rivalries. From King Feysâl of Iraq up to King Abdullâh I of Transjordan, Islamic voices orientated toward inter-Abrahamitic brotherhood were silenced, and irrational hostility toward Zionism was introduced as supposed necessary ingredient of both Arab nationalism and pseudo-Islamic radicalism.

The Qur’ân relates and confirms the words by which Moses ordered the Israelites to conquer the Land that was in the hand of the seven Canaanite nations:

Moreover – and those who try to appropriate Islam as a weapon against Israel always forget to take this point in due account – the Holy Qur’ân does not hint to exile as a permanent condition for the Jewish people, but on the contrary announces a re-establishment of the House of Israel in the Land before the last judgment, where it says:

Liberation of Jerusalem is used as a powerful propagandistic tool by those recent revivalists that look at immigration in Western countries as a mean to prepare as supposed military restoration of a new Islamic Caliphate over territories that were included in the Ottoman Sultanate. Contemporary radical movements that are tolerated in the United Kingdom are critical against the "moderate deviation" of historical groups of fundamentalism, like Ikhwâns or Tahrîr. (10) The Muslim Brotherhood is attached because of its "compromise with the system of unbelief", a definition that hints at its acceptance of a role of legal opposition in both Egypt and Jordan. The more those unreflective people get drowned in irrational utopia, the more they are rooted in the conviction that their own sect is the only rightly guided branch of believers.

Those who are interested in developing the spiritual, ethic and gnostic dimension of the Islamic faith are put under accusation as "deviated sufis", and intolerance and revanshism in the Arab-Israeli conflict are wrongly identified as parameters of purity of belief. As a consequence of this pseudo-conceptual apparatus, PLO’s secular supporters are ready to admit that Jerusalem is a holy city for Muslim and Christians only, while Islamists are incline to describe even the Christian presence as a "fruit of Crusades". In both cases, the Jewish heritage is ignored as a whole, with the clear attempt even to remove it from historical memory. When al-Quds and Hayât al-Jadîdah newspapers quoted the PLO-appointed "muftî" Ikrâmah Sabrî as saying "There is no evidence that Solomon’s Temple was in Jerusalem; probably it was in Bethlehem or in some other place" one cannot but reflect on a single point: a relevant section of local unlearn population is really inclined to take these words for granted, notwithstanding the fact that they contradict both historical evidence and Islamic sources.

The most common argument against Islamic acknowledgment of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem is that, since al-Quds (11) is a Holy Place for Muslims, they cannot accept it to be ruled by non-Muslims, because this kind of acceptance would amount to a betrayal of Islam. Before expressing our point of view about this question, we must reflect upon the reason for which Jerusalem and Masjid al-Aqsâ hold such a sacred position in Islamic faith. As Muslims and non-Muslims know, the rating of Jerusalem among Islamic Holy Places mainly depends on al-Isrâ’ (the night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem) and al-Mi‘râj (the Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad, S, to heaven). Islamic sources agree on the point that this ascension started from the Rock, mostly identified with the Stone of Foundation dealt with in Jewish sources. Shaykhs of Islamic esotericism (tasawwuf) (12) claim that this Rock is a living being, who bears witnessing for those who visit it. This is proved by the fact that, after al-Isrâ’ and before al-Mi’râj, the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) greeted it by saying,

To remember the historical milieu compels every sincere observer to admit that there is no necessary connection between al-Mi‘râj and sovereign rights over Jerusalem since, in the time when the Prophet (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) consecrated the place with his footprints on the Stone, the City was not a part of the Islamic State – whose borders were then limited to the Arabian Peninsula – but under Byzantine administration. Moreover, although radical preachers try to remove this from exegesis, the Glorious Qur’ân expressly recognizes that Jerusalem plays for the Jewish people the same role that Mecca has for Muslims. We read in Sûrah al-Baqarah:

All Qur’anic annotators explain that "thy qiblah" is obviously the Ka‘bah of Mecca, while "their qiblah" refers to the Temple Site in Jerusalem. To quote just one of the most important of them, we read in Qâdî Baydâwî’s Commentary:

As opposed to what sectarian radicals continuously claim, the Book that is a guide for those who abide by Islam - as we have just now shown - recognizes Jerusalem as Jewish direction of prayer; some Muslim exegetes also quote the Book of Daniel (15) as a further proof. After a deep reflection about the implications of this approach, it is not difficult to understand that separation in directions of prayer is a mean to decrease possible rivalries in management of Holy Places. For those who receive from Allah the gift of equilibrium and the attitude to reconciliation, it should not be difficult to conclude that, as no one is willing to deny Muslims a complete sovereignty over Mecca, from an Islamic point of view - notwithstanding opposite, groundless propagandistic claims - there is not any sound theological reason to deny an equal right of Jews over Jerusalem.

The first century of Islamic era was characterized by a sudden expansion of the State centered in Medina outside the borders of the Arabian Peninsula. The first Caliph and successor of the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam), Abû Bakr as-Siddîq, whose government lasted two years only, from 632 to 634 CE, was able to win the so-called War of apostasy (16) and to firmly unite all Arabia under a stable administration. The second Caliph, ‘Omar Ibn al-Khattâb, engaged himself in defensive wars against the two most important powers of that time, the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire of Sassanids. The influence of Byzantium started to withdraw in front of the Islamic expansion, but survived till the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II Fathi, in 1453 CE. On the contrary, the Persian Empire collapsed and disappeared during ‘Omar’s Caliphate: in 637 CE the last Sassanid Shah was defeated in the battle of Qadisiyyah, while the conquest of the whole Empire will be complete soon after, with the victory of Nihavând (641 CE). Some years before, in 638 CE, ‘Omar had entered Aelia Capitolina and annexed the former province of Judea to the Territory of Islam. From that time on, with the exclusion of the period of the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom, the City will constantly be under the nominal sovereignty of a Caliph, until the end of World War I and the beginning of the British mandate.

It is necessary to remark that Jerusalem’s inclusion in Islamic dominion was not an armed conquest, but the result of a peace agreement between ‘Omar and Sophronius, the Christian Bishop of Jerusalem. It could seem strange that a Christian clergyman, whose authority includes local administration of the City, should decide to separate his position from a Christian empire and choose the leader of a new religion as protector. Looking for a possible explanation of his behavior, it can be said that, since Sophronius understood in advance the results of Islamic-Byzantine conflict, he decided to side with the winning part and to avoid to be involved in defeat. From another perspective, we must recall what kind of theology of the kingdom was incorporated in Byzantine Weltanschauung: as a successor of Constantine the Great, the Emperor of Byzantium was regarded as a leader whose authority over the Church derived directly from God; according to this approach, the Patriarch of Constantinople was no more than the supreme imperial chaplain, and the honorific primacy that all Byzantine bishops recognized to him was more a pledge of submission to the Emperor than a sign of independence of the religious hierarchy from the temporal power.

Considering Jerusalem as a part of the Empire meant both admitting a sovereign authority of the Emperor and a prevalence of the Patriarch of Constantinople over local bishops. Of course, because of the role of Jerusalem in the beginnings of Christianity, its bishops have always been dissatisfied in accepting a prevalence of Rome or Constantinople since, from their own point of view, that implied admitting that the Mother of all Christian Churches must be submitted to Churches that were not even existing during Jesus Christ’s life. Apart from this, Byzantine taxation system was quite unbearable for the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and for that reason the Empire was not at all popular. After getting informed about the main features of Islamic doctrine, Sophronius realized that surrender to ‘Omar, while being less onerous from a fiscal point of view, would have permitted, for the first time, a complete autonomy of the Church of Jerusalem and his own independence from more authoritative bishops.

Unfortunately, all historical documents dealing with this period are late and based on oral sources; (17) the same document called ‘Omar’s Decree (18) is probably not the original text of the agreement between the Caliph and the Bishop, but an edict issued about eighty years later by the Ommayyad Caliph ‘Omar Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azîz. What can be stated as certain is that, during negotiations, Sophronius was in vain trying to obtain the subscription of two conditions, that is to say, the preservation of the Roman act that prevented Jews from living in Jerusalem and the maintenance of Mount Moriah as a waste area of ruins, deprived of any kind of religious buildings.

‘Omar’s reaction was clear in denying opportunities for the transfer of the theology of the "rejected people" from a Christian repertoire to an Islamic milieu and, in our humble opinion, the analysis of his attitude should be a powerful admonition for those deviated antizionist propagandists who have nothing better to do than translating the protocols of the Elders of Zion into Eastern languages and introducing them as reliable documents. Had the learnt at least a bit from ‘Omar Ibn al-Khattâb, their attitude toward their brothers in Abraham would have never been so blameworthy.

The attitude manifested by Sophronius can be fully understood by looking at Christian theology of replacement, as it devolved after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus (70 CE), and by comparing it to what can be reconstructed of Jesus’ sincere attitude toward the Israelite dispensation. It is now commonly accepted that the real beginning of systematic Christian theology can be identified with the preaching of Paul of Tarsus and with his innovative doctrine of a new and eternal covenant, sealed with the supposed blood of Jesus and abrogating the Covenant of Mount Sinai and the commandments of the Torah. In this perspective, the Church becomes the "new Israel of God", while Jews were only understood as relics of the past, as descendent of the "old Israel" who have refused to recognize the Messiah; their existence must be preserved as a sign of God’s rejection, until the time of their final conversion to Christianity. This was the basic eschatological reading of the role of Judaism after Jesus, and no relevant change of orientation can be noticed inside Christian Churches until the Council Vatican II. The cooperation between the late Card. Bea, Anti-Defamation League and Prof. Maria Vingiani paved the way for overstepping centuries of misunderstanding, and we are praying to see an analogous Jewish-Muslim dialogue to grow and increase.

Of course, while recognizing the fundamental value of the renovation introduced by the Declaration "Nostra aetate", it seems quite difficult to subscribe the affirmation according to which "the Church has never thought antisemitism". Apart from the unambiguous tone of St. John Chrysostom’s sermons and from a similar attitude present in most of the Father of the Church, the same New Testament is a clear witness of how the old theology of replacement was firstly elaborated. In Paul’s First Letter to Thessalonians we read:

The logical passage is: opposition to our confession means both that He is not please with them, and that all humanity must take step to prevent "Judaization". After having been cleaned from its original ground, this syndrome " difference = perversion" is against prepared for transplant, as a mean of deculturization for neo-integrism in Poland, for Farrakhanists in the United States and for extremist groups of the Mediterranean area. While intellectuals can do their best to analyze this migration and the risks it implies, men of religion are bound, in front of God and their co-religionists, to show that its fundament does not fit the faith in monoanthropogenesis, and opposes the truth expressed by the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) with the words:

From all documents and sources today disposable for scholars, it is possible to rediscover that the original attitude Jesus son of Mary and his disciples where having toward Judaism, toward the Law and the Prophets, was quite opposite; we have no extensive written sources dealing with the Judeo-Christian Church before Pauline reformation but, by taking into consideration different elements, it is possible to declare that Jesus was regarding himself as a pious and orthodox Israelite, and not as a founder of a new religion or an incarnated divine person. According to the liberal school of Protestant theology it is even doubtful that Jesus was regarding himself as the Messiah of Israel before the last year of his life. Likewise, before Paul the community of Jesus’ disciples was composed of Jews who differentiate themselves from the rest of their co-religionists because of their Messianic understanding of their Master’s mission. Obviously, a claim to be the Messiah is not enough to eradicate the claimant or his followers from the Community of Israel. As it is know to almost all the Jews, Rabbi Akiva proclaimed Bar Kokheba as the Messiah during his revolt against the Romans. The Rabbis regarded this claim of his as wrong but, notwithstanding this, they are yet considering Rabbi Akiva as an eminent representative of orthodox Judaism.

It must not be forgotten that the order of the books that form the New Testament is not chronological; Christian scholars generally admit that the four canonical Gospels where fixed in their present Greek form after Paul’s preaching. No complete document is able to tell us what Christian doctrine was in the period when Paul was yet a Pharisee but, nevertheless, by relying on wisdom and reading between the lines of post-Pauline sources, it is possible to find some declarations attributed to Jesus which fully reveal his integral submission to the Holy One, and for this reason are not easily reconcilable with Pauline doctrine concerning the abrogation of the Torah.

While dealing with the permanent value of Torah, Jesus is quoted by Matthew as saying,

In the same spirit, while discussing with a Samaritan woman by Jacob’s well, according to John, Jesus used words that can only be understood a vindication of Davidic messianism:

After the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, and the rebuilding of the new Roman-style City called Aelia Capitolina ordered by the Emperor Hadrian (76-138 CE), Jews were forbidden to live inside its walls by imperial decree. This provision involved all those who can be catalogued as belonging to the Jewish people, that is to say, also the members of the newly-formed Jewish-Christian Community leaded by James, Jesus’ brother and first Bishop of Jerusalem. Hadrian’s banishment of Jews has, among its relevant consequences, the complete disappearance of Jewish-Christians from the history of the Church and the election – as James’s successor – of Makarios, a Bishop of Jerusalem having pagan origins. (22)

The order that prevented Jews to enter Zion was also retained after the declaration of Christian faith as the official religion of Roman Empire by the Emperor Theodosius I (346-395 CE) but,by its insertion among the elements of Christian understanding of the role of Jerusalem, this ban acquired a new theological significance, since it was read as a historical confirmation of the abrogation of Sinaitic covenant and of the permanent dignity of the Church as the only instrument of salvation for all peoples.

The Gospels attributes to Jesus a prophecy according to which the Second Temple would have soon be destroyed, so that no stone will remain in its place; the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans was immediately read as a direct realization of Jesus’ words. According to Christian tradition, the Shekinah let the Temple in the exact moment of Jesus’ claimed death on the cross, while Titus’s conquest was seen as a direct consequence of God’s anger against those who refused the Messiah. By denying to recognize Jesus as the Emmanuel announced by the Prophet Isaiah, (23) according to Pauline theology, Jews had lost the right to be regarded as heirs of the promise made to Abraham, and their heritage had been transferred to "the new Israel". We can easily realize that, while sharing this outlook, a Christian bishop like Sophronius should think that, having lost their rights as heirs of the Kingdom, Jews should be prevented to live inside the boundaries of the Messianic Capital. In the same perspective, any attempt to rebuild the Temple or to reopen its Area as a Center of worship would cancel the visible traces of the collapse announced by Jesus and happened about seventy years after his birth..

From historical sources, we know that ‘Omar refused both of the proposed condition; as for Temple Mount, his first desire in entering Aelia was to find the place of al-Mi‘râj, whose features he had learned directly from Prophet Muhammad’s telling, and to build a mosque there; as for the anti-Jewish ban, he thought that Islamic Sharî‘ah could never permit to allow Christians what was denied to Jews. This was understood as defiance from the principle of equanimity toward the People of the Book. Without taking into account Sophronius’s vehement remonstrance, ‘Omar supported the development of a proto-Zionist migration in the first century of hijrah, and permitted seventy Jewish families from Tyberiades to settle in the quarter situated to the south-west of Temple Mount, in the same area that is presently called Jewish Quarter. Apart from is clear intention to show that Muslims were not disposed to support, to assimilate or to reproduce Christian anti-Judaism, the end of the banishment can also be read as a sign of gratitude for the contribute the Jewish Community has given in helping him to identify the Place of Muhammad’s Ascension.

When Sophronius was requested to show ‘Omar the collocation of Mount Moriah, he clearly understood the sanctity Muslims were attributing to that Place and, maybe supposing that ‘Omar would reopen it as an Islamic sanctuary, maybe fearing his reaction in learning that such a Holy Place has been used by Christian as a deposit for garbage, he repeatedly lied, inducing ‘Omar to make confusion between Moriah and Golgotha, and telling him that the Temple Site was exactly under the Holy Sepulcher’s Church. ‘Omar could not believe such a thing, because he had learned directly from the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) that Mount Moriah was towering over the whole City. The exact identification of the Mount became possible when a Jewess showed ‘Omar the direction toward which her co-religionists used to pray from time immemorial. 

According to Islamic sources, ‘Omar visited Temple Mount together with Ka‘b al-Ashraf, a Rabbi converted to Islam that, because of his learning in Judaica, was regarded as the Caliph’s special counselor for all matters connected to the history of Israel. While discussing about the position of the new Mosque, Ka‘b suggested that, since Jerusalem is to north of Mecca, by building the Mosque in the northern side of the Esplanade, Muslims could pray facing both their former and their new qiblah, (24) but ‘Omar decided not to unite what the Allah Ta‘alâ had separated, and ordered the Mosque to be built in southern side, the result being that, as everyone can presently see, while praying in Masjid al-Aqsâ, Muslims direct their face toward Mecca and their backs toward the Rock.

Without entering the specific theological approaches behind these differences in judgment, we can simplify and say that ‘Omar’s and Ka‘b’s points of view reflect two attitudes to emphasize – respectively – hiatus or continuity between Islam and the message of the Prophets before Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam). In their respective collocation, both of them are rooted in reality, and have more or less influenced the development of Islamic canonical expertise.

The beginning of the eighteenth century CE saw the emergence in the Arabian Peninsula of a movement that was going to change in a relevant way the equilibrium of the Islamic world, and contribute to the birth of other anti-intellectual and spontaneistic tendencies.

Arabia was among the most desolate part of the Ottoman Empire, and its only interest was in the fact that its territory included the two Holy City of Mecca and Medina. Ottoman Sultans were satisfied with a simple nominal sovereignty over this area, while the power was effectively in the hand of local emirs and chiefs of tribes, whose loyalty toward the Caliph was sea-roving and conditioned by criteria like exemption from taxation, share in governmental incoming and the like. The City of Mecca, was a sort of separate body, under the authority of the Sharîf, the elder representative of the Hashemite family. As a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam), the Sharîf of Mecca was among the first ones to pledge alliance when a new Caliph was elected. His support was regarded as one of the most important forms of legitimization of the Ottoman government.

The man whose destiny was to create a break in the continuity of the transmission of Islamic sciences was Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb, a descendent of the Banî Tamîm tribe who was born in the Uyaynah village (Najd) in 1111 of hijrah (1699 CE). His father was a learnt Hanbali scholar, and sent him to study tafsîr, (25) fiqh (26)  and tasawwuf  (27) in Mecca, Medina, Baghdad, Basrah and Damascus, as well as in Iran and India. His attitude, from the beginning, was very much polemic, and he took active part in scholarly debates. During this period, he received the surname "the shaykh from Najd". He contacted many Murshids of tasawwuf, and tried his best to be appointed as a khalîfah. (28)  This request of his, however, was not accepted, since the Shaykhs realized he was too much influenced by pride and by his mundane desire for leadership.

At the age of thirty-two, he came back to Najd and started working as a teacher for Bedouins; he showed his proficiency in academic debates and his independence in judgment. He was by no means disposed to accept to abide by the principles of one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, but was fond of independent reasoning and incline to criticize even those authorities that were regarded by all Muslim scholars as indisputable. Step by step, he became convict of the fact that the Islamic society was degenerated, and that a reform was necessary. According to his point of view, traditional veneration of Muslim saints should be identified with idol-worship, and those who were involved in it must be regarded as apostate from Islam. In his analysis of supposed "deviations" and "degenerations" he became more and more extremist, and for this reason was refuted and excommunicated by his former teachers and even by scholars of his own family.

In 1730 CE he met a leader of a gang of savage marauders called Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ûd, whose main activity was plundering pilgrims and travelers in the desert of Najd. Since most of those Bedouins living in Dar’iyyah were completely unlearnt, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb could easily convict them of his theories; Ibn Sa‘ûd and him made an agreement, according to which the former was appointed as the political leader (amîr), and the latter as the religious authority (shaykh). The "shaykh" declared he was ready to publish a "fatwa" where non-Wahhabi Muslims were described as apostates and idol-worshippers; this point of view obviously represented a sort of "religious justification" for Ibn Sa‘ûd’s mob. They were not, anymore, robbers and criminals, but "fighters of jihâd", authorized to kill "unbelievers", to plunder their properties and to rape their women.

The "shaykh" also appointed some representatives (wakîls) and send them to preach his cult in Mecca, but scholars living in the Holy City were ready in understanding how dangerous this doctrine was. Sayyid Ahmad ibn Zaynî Dahlân, was the Chief Muftî of Mecca. He wrote in the book Al-Futûhât al-Islâmiyyah,

Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb’s brother, Sulaymân Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb, studied his works and tried his best to invite him to repentance. At least, when he realized verbal admonitions had no effect, decided to write a book called As-Sawâ’iq al-Ilâhiyyah fî Raddi ‘alâ al-Wahhâbiyyah. It contains a detailed refutation of his brother’s heresies, and states:

Another contemporary scholar, Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân Effendi wrote:

When the order from the Amîr of Mecca reached the Khalîfah in Istanbul, he ordered Muhammad ‘Alî Pashah, governor of Egypt to move to Najd and to stop the Wahhabi sediction. Among Sunni ‘ulemâ’ who refuted Wahhabism we can also mention Sayyid Dawud Ibn Sulaymân, Mawlânâ Khalid al-Baghdâdî, Sun‘ Allâh al-Halabî al-Makkî al-Hanafî, Muhammad Ma‘sûm as-Sarhindî, Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Madanî ash-Shâf‘î. The latter was the Shâf‘î Muftî of Medina, and was asked to write a fatwa against Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb. This fatwa is quoted in the book Ashadd al-Jihâd and declares,

As-Sayyid ‘Abd ar-Rahmân al-Ahdâl wrote,

Although thousands of Muslims were exterminated by Wahhabis, the scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah continued to refute them in their books. An example is what the Muftî of Mecca, Ahmad Zayni al-Makkî ash-Shâf‘î wrote in a work titled Fitnah al-Wahhâbiyyah, stating,

These happenings we have shortly described were able to change the exterior face of the Islamic world. Mecca and Medina, the two Sanctuaries from which Islam spread to the rest of the world, were not anymore centers of transmission of the Sunni heritage of Islamic sciences, but places where some aspects of the worship according the four school of Islamic law was hardly persecuted, while a primitive and literalist cult was propagated through violence and coercion. The creation of a world center of Wahhabi propaganda (the World Islamic League) (37) in Mecca was the final result of a project whose goal was replacing orthodox Islam with the heretic "Salafi school". (38)

From the second half of the nineteenth century CE, Salafis identified the opponent to be silenced with the University of al-Azhar al-Sharîf in Egypt and with other traditional center of diffusion of Sunni teaching, always alert concerning new theories and individual theological interpretations. The main instrument for a "Wahhabisation of the Arab milieu" was the organization called Ikhwân al-Muslimûn (The Muslim Brotherhood), whose founder was Hasan al-Bannah, an elementary master from Ismailiyyah who became one of the leaders of pro-British Masonry (United Lodge of England, Mother of the World) in Egypt. From a religious point, of view he was a "reformer" (but no so advanced in Islamic sciences), and from a political point of view he was radically anti-Ottoman. By creating his own sect, his goal was to select a new ruling class, whose ideology was a form of "modernized and westernized Islam". From that time on, leadership inside the movement is hereditary, and only members of certain families can hope to get important positions.

After World War II, Nasser tried his best to outlaw the sect, but he only contributed to increase its secretness. Assad bombed Hama’, a Syrian city that was the central of their intelligence. Even more than before, members of the Brotherhood learn to deny connection to their organization, and even to refuse that the sect simply exists. From this point of view, there are similarities between their struggle for leadership and some behaviors of organized criminality. These kind of pseudo-radical leaders are extremely arrogant in imposing their hegemony over Muslim organizations and communities.; in most of cases, these so called "basic militants of Islamism " are – from a religious point of view – laypersons who generally miss the basic of Islamic sciences, but they are appointed as "imâms" of important mosques, especially in democratic countries, were there is no "Ministry of Awqâf and Religious Affairs" to check their orientation and where imâms having a regular ijâzah shar’î area rare exception. (39)

In most of Western countries, Ikhwans immigrated as University students and start creating legal organizations in different sectors. Palestinian Hamâs is one of the important Ikhwans-controlled organizations in Middle East, but the problem is that their heads are not among the original families of founders; on a worldwide level, the leadership is – as before – in the hand of Syrians and Egyptians. For a radical militant who is poor, unlearn and fanatized, the only goal is being involved in throwing stones, terrorism or suicide bombing but, for those who are a bit cleverer and sharp-minded, the main opportunity is going abroad as a student, and than became a fulltime professional propagandist. He will spent his life visiting mosques in US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, etc., and go on speaking (and it is nothing more than a speech) about "jihâd for Palestine", "fighting against the Zionist enemy" and the like. By implementing this plan, he will get a regular, generous salary, will receive funds for his activities, and probably will also learnt how to collect donations, not only from sponsors, but even from local followers. Their doctrine is that "People working in charity can be paid for their work by the money they collect". They start collecting money for poor children in Palestine, for refugees in Kosovo, for Bosnia, and after a week their leaders have new luxury items, that obviously are not declared as a private property. The Egyptian branch controls a charitable institution called "Islamic Relief", while the Palestinian branch is supported by Emirates through Human Appeal International.

From a theological point of view, Ikhwani beliefs were refuted by Sunni scholars of the Ottoman period but, after World War II, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was in need of allies against secular Nasserianism, and the Egyptian leader of the Brotherhood, Sayyed Qutb, received an unaspected and worldwide financial support. From that time on, the vast majority of Ikhwans adopted the Wahhabi belief, and only an insignificant minority of them is Sunni. Qutb’s heir is Yûsuf al-Qardâwî, an Egyptian professor that controls Ministry of Awqâf in Qatar.

The game of fundraising is based on conflicts between the Egyptian, the Syrian and the Palestinian branches; as soon as - for instance - Saudi Arabia starts increasing its support for one branch, Kuwait and Emirates are interested in financing their opponents. Real local leaders have never official positions inside depending organizations, and their legal representatives are usually employed as figureheads only.

The Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is an organization that was created and is controlled by the Brotherhood; it works in the United States as a lobby against journalists, media operators, movie producers, etc. who dares to write things that do not fit their limited interpretation. Their level of intolerance is quite extreme, and their attitude is non-dialectic, not pondered and aggressive. Another Ikhwans-depending organization is The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), whose goal is controlling local mosques as soon as they are opened. The leader of the Haqqani-Kabbani cult, Mr. Hishâm Kabbânî, has recently declared in an Open Forum with the US State Department:

Although we cannot accept to recognize Mr. Kabbânî as an authoritative scholar, and also share the point of view of those who consider him a former-Muslim and the founder of a new American syncretistic cult, (41) nevertheless we have no difficulty in admitting that he is describing a real situation; the percentage of over eighty percent of mosques controlled by extremists is a matter of fact, not only in North America, but also in most of Western Europe. Since the link between Hamâs and CAIR is their dependence from a common secret central, and since that organization is applying strict secrecy, it is impossible to have written proofs of all these connections. You will never find even a single piece of paper signed as "The Muslim Brotherhood".

As about Italy, here there are two Ikhwans-controlled organizations: the Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII) and the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani (USMI). Although their members do not exceed the total number of hundred persons, they are able to control a certain number of mosques that exist in the Italian territory. During last years, two of their leaders, ‘Omar Tariq and Abu Ja’far have been expelled by a decree of the Minister of Interior, since their presence in the country was regarded as dangerous for the national security. (42) Our Institute is cooperating with the Presidency and the Direction of the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia, with the Italian Branch of Râbitah and with the Net of the Italian Islamic Organizations to reduce their influence, to limit their intrusiveness and to refute their claim to represent the Community in front of the Italian Republic.

The "theory of the plot" was developed, inside the Catholic milieu, as an attempt to avoid rational implications in the analysis of the process of modernization induced by industrialization. The theocratic absolutism was defeated by the logic of liberal democracy, and the alliance between the throne and the altar replaced by the power of the Third State. Theoreticians of Catholic integralism were not able to explain such development from an historical point of view, and – from Abbè Barruel on – their hermeneutic approach started assuming the narrative time of a "metaphysics of evil". Behind any social and cultural change, it is identified the activity of the Demo-Pluto-Jewish-Masonic intrigue, and secularization is read as the consequence of a worldwide conspiracy.

This "ideology of the complot" is an integral part of extreme-wing European thought, and is common among the followers of Msgr. Lefebvre and other opponents of the spirit of the Council Vatican II. Radical pseudo-Islamic movements are absorbing it as a valid tool for another pseudo-historical justification. The establishment of the State of Israel is again described as a fruit of a "Zionist intrigue", and the so-called "political anti-Zionism" reveals its true face as a mask beyond which antisemitism and anti-Judaism are disguised. This is the pseudo-religious ideology that – insha Allah Ta‘alâ – we are interest in analyzing, describing and refuting. We hope that Allah will help with His everlasting blessing those scholars and imâms who understand how urgent is to clean the Islamic milieu from similar unworthy tendencies.

Notes

1) While In Arab countries the Protocols are distributed by private editors like Dâr al-Fikr and Maktaba al-Wataniyyah, after the advent of the Khomeinist regime in Iran, an English and a French translation were realized and distributed by Sazmân Tablîghât-e Islâm, a publishing house depending on the Ministry of Ershâd. From 1984 CE, these booklets, including a map with a representation of the "Zionist serpent", where distributed by Iranian Embassies and Consulates in Europe.

2) On September 12, 1998 the Majlis al-‘Ulemâ’ of the Italian Muslim Association (AMI) took an official stand about the election of a supposed new "muftî of Jerusalem and of the Holy Land", appointed within PLO’s entourage. The main objection – put by Shaykh ‘Ali Hussen and confirmed by Shaykh Muhammad Shawky – is depending "on the fact that the consensus of Sunni Muslims is to admit protection of Masjid al-Aqsâ for none but Mâlik Husseyn Ibn Talâl al-Hashemi al-Urdunî." The Assembly declared "to renew of his recognition of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Azîm Salhun as the only legitimate Muftî of Jerusalem, while inviting Mr. Sabrî to ask for Allah’s forgiveness and to desist from his groundless claim.

While I was writing these, pages, I was reach by the new that the Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan was accepted in the mercy of Allah. We immediately stopped our activities, and arranged congregations for burial service, asking Allah to forgive this brother of ours, a worthy descendant of purified forefathers. May Muslims learn from his sincere example the habit to self-criticism and the inclination for reconciliation. May Allah be pleased with him as He is pleased with his family.

3) This definition depends of the fact that, according to our point of view, radicalism is not even a degenerated and extreme form of the Islamic belief, but a secular ideology that repeatedly abuses the name of Islam as a mean of searching consensus among illiterate laypersons who are sincere in their religious feeling, but lacking of elementary religious training.

4) The original Arabic word we translated as "kingdom" is mulk, from a Semitic root m-l-k, that is common to both Arabic and Hebrew. According to Islamic theological terminology, the three synonymous for "kingdom" are mulk, malakût and jabarût. They respectively refer to physical, psychical and spiritual level of existence. Of course, God can be called King of all of them; if here only mulk is quoted, it depends on the fact that this verse directly concerns the earthly domain. To denote a kingdom in secular and political sense, the Arabic language commonly uses another derived form, that is mamlakah.

5) Qur’ân III. 26. Because of typographic reasons, it is not possible to reproduce here the original Arabic text of the Book, which must nevertheless be understood as quoted. As well here as in other Qur’anic quotations, the English translation of the meaning of Qur’anic words from Arabic is my own, but based on the most authoritative English commentaries, like M. Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of The Glorious Qur’ân (Beirut 1973), ‘A. Yûsuf ‘Alî, The Holy Qur’ân - Text, Translation and Commentary (Maryland 1983).

6) The "remote Mosque", on the southern side of Temple area. According to the most authoritative Islamic sources, it is built on the place where the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) completed al-Isrâ’. Cf. Qur’ân XVII. 1.

7) Qur’ân II. 47, 140; VII.140.

8) Qur’ân V. 20-21 (emphasis added).

9)  Qur’ân XVII. 104 (emphasis added).

10) As about Ikhwân al-Muslimûn (The Muslim Brotherhood) see ultra, par. 7). Hizb al-Tahrîr (The Party of Liberation) is one of the most important radical movements from West Bank, and is illegal in Jordan. It supports the "restoration of the Islamic Caliphate" and accuses Ikhwâns of "compromise with the forces of unbelief".

11) Arabic name of Jerusalem, from the root q-d-s, meaning "holiness". It is an abridged form of Bayt al-maqdis, "the sanctified House" or "the House of the Sanctuary", an exact equivalent of Hebrew Beth ha-mikdash. The name originally referred only to the Temple Mount, and was afterward extended to the City as a whole. This extension of meaning became common among Arab from the tenth century CE. Earlier Islamic sources use the name Iliyâ’, an adaptation to Arabic pronunciation of the Roman name Aelia.

12) About the link between Islamic esotericism and the cosmic cycle cf. R. Guénon, Les Mystères de la lettre Nûn, in "Études Traditionelles", August-September 1938, reproduced in Symboles fondamentaux de la Science sacrée, Gallimard (Paris 1962). Cf. also T. Burckhardt, Introduction aux doctrines èsotèriques de l’Islam, Dervy-Libres (Paris 1969); S. H. Nasr, The Sufism, Allen & Unwin (London 1964).

13) Qur’ân II. 145.

14) M. Shaykh Zâdeh, Hâshiyyah ‘alâ Tafsîr al-Qâdî al-Baydâwî , Hakîkat Kitabevi (Istanbul 1979), Vol. 1, p. 456.

15) Dan VI.10.

16) See Elias S. Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia, University of Toronto Press - The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing (Beirut 1972), p. 150-164.

17) Cf. Muhammad Ibn Jarîr at-Tabarî, Akhbâr ar-Rusul wa al-Mulûk (History of Messengers and Kings), especially the chapter dealing with al-Mi‘râj of "Bâb Sayyidnâ Muhammad" and "Bâb ‘Omar". A complete, scientific English translation of this work has been started by Oxford University Press, but until now only three volumes have been published. See also Jalâl ad-din as-Suyûtî, Târîkh al-Khulafâ’ (History of the Caliphs)  and Mujîr al-‘Ayn al-Muqaddasî, Al-ums al-jalîl fî târîkh al-Quds wa al-Khalîl (The Noble Society in the History of Jerusalem and Hebron, manuscript, al-Azhar Library).

18) See A. Eder, Peace Is Possible between Ishmael and Israel according to the Qur’ân, with a Preface by A. H. Palazzi (Jerusalem 1997), p. 18.

19) 1 Thess II. 14-15 (emphasis added). The English translation of the Books of the New Testament, as well as their abbreviations, are quoted according to the Revised Standard Version, American Bible Society (New York 1971).

20) Mt V. 17-19.

21) Jn IV. 22.

22) Cf.A. Chouraqui, Jérusalem, une ville sanctuaire, Éditions du Rocher (Paris 1996),pp. 116-122.

23) Is VII. 14-17. Jewish traditional understanding of this text is obviously quite different from the Christian one.

24) As it is generally known, Muslims used to pray orientating themselves toward Jerusalem, when a Qur’anic revelation ordered Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) to change the qiblah and to move toward Mecca. In that moment Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam) was leading the congregational prayer in a Mosque in Medina, and completed his prayer by turning toward the new qiblah. See Qur’ân II. 144. Presently that Mosque is called Masjid al-qiblatayn (Mosque of the two qiblahs) and – differing from all other mosques – it has two indicators of qiblah (mihrâbs), one toward Jerusalem and the other toward Mecca.

25) The science of Qur’anic exegesis.

26) Islamic jurisprudence, based on four authoritative schools (madhhabs ).

27) The esoteric aspect of the Islamic faith. See note 12.

28) The literal meaning of this word is "vice-regent". The successor of the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam)as a head of the Islamic State is called Khalîfah. Inside orders of tasawwuf, the khalîfah is the representative of the Shaykh in a certain area.

29) Quoted by Shaykh Husseyn Hilmî ‘Ishîq in Advice for the Muslim, Hakîkat Kitabevi (Istanbul 1989), p. 256. The main source for this compilation is Ayyûb Sabrî Pashah’s work Mir’ât al-Haramayn, 5 Voll., Matb’a-e Bahriye (Istanbul 1301-1306 AH).

30) It means "the two authoritative ones". It is a technical expression to refer to the most important Collections of hadîths, edited by Imâm Bukhârî and Imâm Muslim.

31) The traditional eulogy for the Prophet Muhammad (sall-Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam), meaning "May Allah bless him and give him peace". It must be understood as implicit in all other passages of this paper where the Prophet is quoted.

32) The Community of those who abide by the prophetic magisterium. It is equivalent to the Muslim Community.

33) The sin of shirk (attributing partners to Allah) has two levels: minor (asghar) and major (akbar). Except saints, ordinary believers cannot reach the domain of complete sincerity in worship, since their intention is tainted by hidden or evident forms of minor shirk. Major shirk, on the contrary, is the sin of those who practice polytheism and idol-worship.

34) Advice for the Muslim, cit., p. 255.

35) Qur’ân. IV.114.

36) Literally "Followers of Tradition and Consensus". It is the legal definition of Sunni Muslims.

37) Râbitah al-‘alamî al-Islamî in Arabic. Strange to say, but the recently founded "Italian section" of the Râbitah has changed the official translation of is name in "World Muslim League". Its Director is H. E. Dr. Mario Scialoja, former Ambassador of Italy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

38) Wahhabis do not like to be identified as such, and refer to themselves as "Salafis", a neologism that should mean "follower of the first generations".

39) A document that authorizes to teach Islamic sciences. It is the equivalent of smicha in orthodox Judaism.

40) Extract from the media Alert forwarded to <soc.religion.islam> newsgroup by Mateen Siddique, official Webmaster of the so-called "Islamic Supreme Council of America" (February 19, 1999).

41) Cf. "Studi Romani", Quarterly of the National Institute for Roman Studies, Vol. XLVI, n. 3-4, chronicle of religious life of the Islamic Community. As about the history of the Haqqani-Kabbani sect and its refutation by Sunni scholars see the Web pages of the Association for Islamic Charitable Project <www.aicp.org/html/preface.htm> and our answers reproduced at <http://amislam.com/qubrusi.htm>

42) Cf. "Il musulmano", Vol. I, n. 1, (May 1993), pp. 2-3.

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Selections from the Islamic Institute:

• A Letter by al-Hafiz Imam ad-Dhahabi  
• The Sunni Articles A refutation of Ibn Taymiyyah
• In Defense of Tawassul About deviations in 'Aqidah
• Fitnatu-l-Wahhabiyyah  by Shaykh Dahlan Mufti al-Haramayn
• A Warning against Muhammad Ibn 'Abdi-l-Wahhab and his Bid'ahs
• Bayan: a Refutation of the Wahhabi Cult Text of the basic ahadith
• A Refutation of Bilal Philips and his Slanders against Ahlu-s-Sunnah 
• Nazim al-Qubrusi and his Deviation from the Naqshbandi Tariqah
• Khutoot Al Areedah An exposition and refutation of the sources of Shi'sm
• Ask Ahlu-d-Dhikr if you Don't Know Answers covering various subjects
• Fatwa on the Deviated "Nation of Islam"
• Questions and Answers concerning Mawlid
• History of  The Italian Muslim Assembly and the Cultural Institute

 

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